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[L. A. No. 22209. In Bank. Jan. 13, 1954.]

Guardianship of the Person and Estate of LELAND SMITH
et aI., Minors. FRIEDA HOWES, as Guardian etc.,
Respondent, v. HARRY COHEN,Appellant.
[1] Guardian and Ward-Selection of Guardian-Appointment of
Farent Against Nonparent.-Where mother of illegitilUllte
minor children is dead and court found that both older daughter and natural father are "fit and proper" persons to be
guardians of the minors and have their custody and control,
but where it appears tha~ additional consideration of fllctual
issues is needed,an order appointing older daughter as
guardian of the persons of such minors on gruund that it
~.:-_ . _"
would be to their "b.est interests and welfare" 'Pill be reversed
It - on father's appeal on judgment roll alone, thus setting at large
l-~:.
all issues of fact for redetermination by trial court.

I

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Loa
Angeles County appointing guardian. Arnold Praeger.
~ Judge. Reversed.

~

Hahn, .ROAS & Saunders and Saul Ross for Appellant.
Clore Warne and' Marwell E. Greenberg, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellant.
:." Juaneita M. Veron for Respondent.
Oswald G. Ingold as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
CARTER, J.-[l] Frieda Howes petitioned to be ap.pointed the guardian of the persons of Leland Smith, a minor
8, and S~aron Smith, a minor of 6, brother and sister. She
.,~elred that she is the sister of the minors; their mother is
their father is Harry Cohen and all reside in Los
~Plell, California; that the minors are now under her care
she has supplied and cared for them since the death of
. their mother; their •• natural" father, Cohen, has •• remarried"
and has a family of the second marriage; that the only rela·
'. tiyes of the minors are their father, petitioner, and a brother,

and

Oal..Tv.. Guardian and Ward, § 13: Am ..Tv., Guardian

129.
DJc. Beference: [1] Guardian and Ward, § 13.

I
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Paul Smith, who lives with petitioner; that they have no
estate. Cohen filed objections to the appointment and requested that he be appointed guardian stating that be is the
"natural" father of the minors, they being the illegitimate
children of Cohen and Marguerite Smith, deceased. their
mother.
The court found all of the allegations of both Frieda and
Cohen are true; that both Frieda and Cohen are "11t and
proper' 'persons to be the guardians of the minors and have
their custody and control; and that it is •• to the best interest
and welfare" of the minors that Frieda be appointed guardian.
It was so ordered and Cohen appeals. He asserts that being
the father of the children, although they are illegitimate, he
has preference in the selection of their guardian. he being a fit
and proper person.
It is settled in this state that in either guardianship proceedings or custody proceedings in a divorce action, the
parents of a legitimate child have preference over a non·
parent and the custody shall not be given to a nonparent un·
less the parent is found unfit. "Where a parent applying for
custody is in a position to take the child and is not shown
to be unfit. the court may not award custody to strangers
merely because it feels that they may be more fit or that they
may be more able to provide financial, t!ducational, social. or
other benefits. . . . [Citing cases.] '[T]he discretionary power
of a trial court necessarily is limited by those provisions of
the code wherein the express policy of the Legislature regarding general questions of custody are set forth (Civ. Code.
§ ~ 138. 197: Prob. Code. §§ 1407 -1408) and by the judicial
interpretation of those code provisions in relation to the
specific questions presented by the instant case.' (Robertson
v. Robertson, 72 Ca1.App.2d 129. 132 [164 P.2d 521.) Section
1407 of the Probate Code provides that as between persons
equally entitled in other respects to the guardianship of a
minor preference is to be given first to a parent. This section
has been construed to be substantially the same as former
section 246(3) of the Civil Code and section 1751 of the Code
of Civil Procedure which provided, in substance. that a parent
if competent is entitled to custody in preference to any other
person. Section 138 of the Civil Code provides that as between parents adversely claiming the custody, neither parent
is entitled to it as of right, but other things being equal. if
the child is of tender years it should be given to the mother:
if it is of an age to require education and preparation for
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labor and business, then to the father. The code sections con·
template that the care of a minor child be awarded to a parent.
if a 6t and proper person. as against a stranger." (Stewart
v. Stewart, 41 Ca1.2d 447. 451 [260 P.2d 44).}
Here the parent, Cohen. the father. was found 6t rather
than unfit and the mother is dead. The only ditference in
this case is that the minors were not the legitimate issue of
Cohen. but that is not significant.
When the mother and father of an illegitimate child are
both alive and he has not been legitimated. the mother is
entitled to his custody. services and earnings to the exclusion
of the father. (Civ. Code. § 200: 1ft re Gille. 65 Cal.App.
617 [224 P. 7841 ; Strong v Owens. 91 Cal.App.2d 336 [205
P.2d 481 ; 51 A.L.R. 1507.) Both the mother and the father
are responsible for his support. (Civ. Code. §§ 196a. 196:
i Schumm v. Berg, 37 Cal.2d 174 [231 P.2d 39. 21 A.L.R.2d
t 1051); Reed v. Hayward, 23 Cal.2d 336 [144 P.2d 561].}
~. On the death of the mother the natural father is entitled to
the custody of an illegitimate child if be is a fit person. (See
,\,
CommOftwealth v. Fuller, 142 Pa.Super. 98 [15 A.2d 518]:
H'tJYu v. Strauss, 151 Va. 136 [144 S.E. 432): Aycock v.
HamptOft, 84 Miss. 204 f36 So. 245. 105 Am.St.Rep. 424. 65
L.R.A. 689]: Moritz v. Garnhart. 7 Watts (Pa.) 302 [32
'Am.Dec. 762] ; People v. Meredith. 272 App.Div. 79 [69 N.Y.S.
2d 462], aft'md. 297 N.Y. 692 f77 N.E.2d 8).) [t bas been
held repeatedly that. while the best interests of an illegitimate
;; child are the important factor. the parents of such a child bave
l a superior claim as against the world to bis custody if they
are fit and proper. (Armstrong v. Pnce. (Mo.App.) 292 S.W
447. mother: JeftSen v. Earley, 63 Utah 604 [228 P. 217].
mother: 1ft re (Jille, IUpra, 65 Cal.App. 617. mother: Ex parle
Wallace, 26 N.M. 181 [190 P. 1020]. father: Garrett v.
~. Mahaley, 199 Ala. 606 [75 So. 10). father: Le1l1lS v. Crowell.
~ 210 Ala. 199 [97 So. 691]. father: People v.Meredith, IUpra.
i~ 69 N.Y.S.2d 462. aft'md. 297 N.Y. 692 [77 N.E.2d 8]: Btate
v. NestatJal, 72 Minn. 415 [75 N.W. 7251: JacksOft v. Luckie.
[. 205 Ga. 100 [52 S.E.2d 588J: Ex parte Schwartzkopf, 149
{ Neb. 460 [31 N.W.2d 294] ; Ex parle Malley. 131 N.J. 404
[25A.2d 630]: French v. Catholic Commuftity League. 69
Ohio App. 442 [44 N.E.2d 113] ; CommOftwealth ex ret. Humaft
v. Hymaft. 164 Pa.Super. 64 [63 A.2d 447]; Templetoft v .
•..Walker. (Tex.Civ.App.) 179 S.W.2d 811; Henderson v. Heft187 Va. 121 [46 S.E.2d 10}; Petition 01 Dickholt~,
~~.

rr,on,

/
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341 DtApp. 400 [94 N.E.2d 89] ; 7 Am.Jur., Bastards, §§ 6166; 10 C.J.S., Bastards, § 17; 51 A.L.R. 1507.)
There is an additional factor in the instant case. As far
as appears the minors have not been legitimated. By awarding their custody to the father they are more likely to be
legitimated because "The father of an illegitimate child, by
publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such,
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family.
and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child,
thereby adopts it as such j and such child is thereupon deemed
for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth." (Civ.
Code, § 230.) Unless the father has the right to custody it is
not probable that he will receive the minors into his home and
thus legitimate them.
This being a judgment roll ~ppeal and the ground of reversal being that the order appealed from is not supported
by the findings, the question is presented as to whether there
should be a general reversal or a reversal with direction to
the trial court to enter an order appointing appellant guardian
of the persons of the minors here involved. Section 53 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides in part: '~The Supreme
Court, and the District Courts of Appeal, may affirm, reverse,
or modify any judgment or order appealed from, and may
direct the proper judgment or order, or direct a new trial
or further proceedings to be had." A proper construction of
the foregoing provision would seem to be that in a case such
as this, this court may, in its discretion, order a general reversal which means that the case is set at large and the issues
of fact must be retried, or may direct the trial court to enter
an order appointing appellant guardian of the minors in the
place of respondent in accordance with the views herein expressed. In view of our conclusion that the trial court may
desire to give further consideration to the factual matters
presented, we deem it appropriate to order a general reversal
of the order, thus setting at large all of the issues of fact
for a redetermination by the trial court.
The order is reversed.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment.
The objection to the rule that custody must be awarded
to the parent unless he is unfit carries the harsh implication
that the interests of the child are subordinated to those of

", - .Tan. 1954 ]
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the parent when the trial court has found that the ~ in·
.terests of the child would be served by giving his custod: to
another. The heart of the problem. however, is how the
best interests of the child are to be served. Is the trial
court more sensitive than the parent to what the child's best
interests are, better qualified to determine how' they are to
be served' It would seem inherent in the very concept of a
fit parent that such a parent would be at least as responsive
as the trial court, and very probably more 80, to the best
interests of the child. The rule requiring that custody be
awarded to such a parent in preference to a stranger does not
operate to subordinate the interests of the child to those of
the parent j it merely serves to define the area of the parent'a
responsibility for the welfare of the child. The eGurt's
ltatutory duty to be "guided by what appears to be for the
best interests of the child in respect to its temporal and
.' Jriental and moral welfare" (Prob. Code, § 14(6) encompasses
'the view that the child'a welfare is part of the responsibility
Of a fit parent.
, One gains perspective by recalling that families are ordinarilv allowed to function without outside interference though
their wisdom in the upbringing of children may vary as
widely as the physical heritage or economic advantages they
. give their children. Unless the upbringing of the child is so
defective as to call for action by the juvenile court, it is un.' likely that an outsider will challenge the parental custody
" or aeek by legal process to prove that the child's welfare
. would best be served elsewhere. It is generally understood
the stability of established family units would be jeopardby outside interference.
,11: is only when the family is dissolved by death, divorce
. separation that conflicting claims to custody are likely to
'If the parents are divorced and no third parties are
1ti1ii~1".~ the court of necessity arbitrates whatever eGnfticting
the parents may have to the custody of the chlldren.
one parent dies, however, or upon divorce is unable or unfit
have custody of a child, outsiders may enter the picture
attack the competence of the other parent to have ensor contend that the child would be better off with them .
.problem may also arise if the parent awarded custody
the time of divorce dies or for other reasons is no longer
to care for the child, or if one or both parents have
~lDgh necessity been unable for a time to care for the child
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themselves, but thereafter seek to regain custody from outsiders whose assistance they had solicited iD the iDterim.
Ordinarily iD any of these circumstances the determination
of what course will best serve the interests of the .child will
involve the consideration of numerous imponderables. All
thiDgs being equal, it is clear that the parent should have
custody. All things are ordiDarUy not equal, however. The
outsider may be able to offer thechUd greater material advantages. In the case of the death of the parent havmg
custody after divorce, the child may be on more iDtimate terms
with relatives or a new spouse of the deceased parent than
with the other parent who has Dot had custody. If the child
has not been iD the custody of either parent he may have been
successfully iDtegrated into the home of the person who has
been caring for him. The parent seeking custody may have
remarried so that if custody is awarded to him, the chUd will
be faced with the problem of adjusting to a stepparent. On
the other hand, the importance of preserving· the relationship
between a natural parent and his chUd cannot be gaiDsaid.
Even in a case where the foster. parent treats the child as his
own, the child may still suffer from the lack of a natural
parent iD the eyes of his playmates, or natural children or
other relatives of his foster parent may discriminate agaiDst
him. If he gets into trouble. members of his foster family
may be tempted to point out that he is not really one of them.
Moreover, even if the child is required to make some sacrifice
to be with his natural parent or adjust to a new environment,
it does not necessarily follow that his welfare will be correspondingly impaired. It may not be to the beat interest of
the chUd to have every advantage. He may derive benefits by
subordinating his immediate interests to the development of
a new family relationship with his own parent, by giviDg as
well as receiviDg. Thus, although a change iD custody from
an outsider to a parent may involve the disruption of a satisfactory status quo, it may lead to a more desirable relationship
in the long run.
The facts of the present case aptly illustrate the problem.
The two children lived with their mother and half sister
until their mother's death. At that time they were 8 and
6 years of age. Their home was disrupted by their mother's
death, and both their half sister and their father now seek
their custody. The trial court bas found that both are fit
and proper persons. It may be assumed that the chUdren
wish to atay with their sister and that their lives will be

/
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less disrupted at this time if they are nllowed to remain with
the relative they know best. On the other hand, unless cus·
tody is given to their father they will remain to all intents and
purposes orphans. If their friends inquire about their father
they will either have to fabricate a story or admit their
illegitimacy. If their sister marries, her husband might be
unwilling to have them in his home. If the children are
awarded to their father, they will become legitimate. (Civ.
Code, § 230.) They will be placed in a normal home en·
vironment with one natural parent and will suffer social
embarrassment only to the extent that their past may become
known to their friends. In all likelihood the care and support
they will receive from their father will be greater if they move
into his home than if they remain essentially strangers to him.
"There are thus many considerations that support the con·
,'clusion that their best interests would be served by awarding
;.eustody to their father. There are also considerations that
iiupport the contrary conclusion of the trial court.
. Psychology is not an exact science. If expert testimony
~were introduced in cases such as this in all probability it
''Would be in conflict. The ordinary judge as well as the
'ordinary parent lacks the omniscience accurately to evaluate
all of the various considerations that may enter into a custody
,problem. "The essence of custody is the companionship of
the child and the right to make decisions regarding his care
and control, education, health, and religion." (Lerner v.
,Superior Court, 38 Ca1.2d 676, 681 [242 P.2d 321].) If a
'parent is fit he will be vitally concerned with the best interests
of his child. By leaving to him the responsibility as to how
,those interests will be best served the court simply recognizes
{that "It is cardinal with us that the custGdy, care and nurture
k~f the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
t' and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
f+'~,either supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra,
,[268 U.S. 510,45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468].
/I,:.And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have
/ (respected the private realm of family life which the state
f: eannot enter." (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(64 S.Ct. 438. 88 L.Ed. 645].)
{ Cases may arise in which the child's interests would be
.: IICriously prejudiced by awarding custody to his parent. In
ch, cases, however, the parent's insistence on his right to
, tody despite the harm that would clearly result to his
"':,', a C.Jd_

)

f

J.

.i'
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child will itself be evidence of his un6tness. (1",.e Bensfteld,
102 Cal.App. 445, 449 [283 P. 112) ; Guardianship 0/ Casad,
106 Cal.App.2d 184, 152 [234 P.2d 647].)
In the present case the appeal is upon the judgment roll
alone, and for the purposes· of this decision we must accept
the finding of the trial court that the father is & fit and
proper person to be appointed guardian of the children. It
bears emphasis, however. that the father of an illegitimate
child comes before the court in at best & questionable light.
Although past indiscretions do not necessarily demonstrate
present unfitness (Prouty v. Prouty, 16 Ca1.2d 190, 193-194
[105 P.2d 295] ; 1" re Oreen, 192 Cal. 714, 721 [221 P. 903] ;
see, also, Clarke v. Clarke, 35 Ca1.2d 259, 261-262 [217 P.2d
4011), such a father should be required to explain why he has
not legitiinated his child. A father who has the power to do
so but does not, demonstrates his unfitness by his willingness
to inflict upon his child the status of illegitimacy. Such &
father must not be allowed to bargain with the court by
offering to exercise his power to legitimate in exchange for
custody. On the other hand, a desire to secure custody may
be the outgrowth of a moral rehabilitation reflected in an
effort to undo a past wrong by legitimating the child.
A father may legitimate his child by marrying the mother
(Civ. Code, § 215) or "by publicly acknowledging it as his
own, receiving it as such, with the consent. of his wife, if he
is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if
it were a legitimate child." (Civ. Code, § 230.) On the record
before us we must assume that the father did not legitimate
his children because he was unable to do so. At the present
time the father is married. To legitimate the children now
he must have the consent of his wife to receive the children
into his family. (Civ. Code, § 230.) There is no express
6nding that his. wife is willing to receive the children into
the family. On retrial the father must establish that the
children wm be legitimated as a minimum prerequisite to
establishing his fitness for appointment as guardian.
SCHAUER,I.-1 dissent.
This is a judgment roll appeal. The facts are not in dispute.
The trial court found "That both petitioner FBIEDA. BOWES
and counter petitioner BARRY COHEN are 6t and proper persons to be the guardian of the minors herein, and to have
their . . . custody • . • That it is to the best interest and
welfare of aaid minor children that FRIEDA. HOWES be &p-

I
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pointed guardian of their persons • • ." The court also found
that the mother of said children is deceased and that .. Petitioner {adult sister of the minors] has supported and cared
for said minors since the death of the mother" and that apl'ellant is the natural father of the children and "is remarried and has a family of the second marriage." Letters of
guardianship were ordered issued to Frieda Howes.
Appellant's sole ground for reversal is that on the iindings,
he, as the children's natural father who is not found "unfit,"
is as a matter of law entitled to judgment denying the petition of the children's sister and ordering the issuance of
letters of guardianship to him. He argues. incidentally, that
the finding "That it is to the best interest and welfare of
said minor children that FRIEDA HoWES be appointed guardian" is immaterial. and must be disregarded. The majority
. opinion sustains appellant's position in its entirety except
that, even though this is a judgment roll appeal, it states
. that a reexamination of the evidence shall be bad.
Appellant does not aver that he desires custody and control
. of the children. He did not initiate proceedings seeking to
be appointed guardian of these children and he does not allege
that he ever has had them in his custody, or heretofore sought
their custody, or that he ever has supported them. He
appears.oDly in response to the petition of Frieda and has
contented himself with filing a document entitled "OBJEo·'1'IONS TO APPoINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AND COUNTER-PE'l'I'l'ION
.P'OB APPOINTMENT OJ' GUARDIAN" wherein he merely "objects
to the appointment of said FRIEDA HOWES as the Guardian
. of said children and desires that if it is deemed by the Courl
tl6cusary that a Guardian be appointed. that be be appointed
Guardian of said children. " (Italics added.) It is also noted
in Frieda's petition for appointment as guardian the
"illegitimate" does not appear: the name of the mother
not appear; the fact of nonmarriage is not aUeged; the
.'MPl:lnjP!nt and sufBcient averments in respect to the mother
the simple words "Mother deceased." How different are
,~'S sensibilities t In his objections to Frieda's appoilntJnellt he bluntly avers" That said minor children are the
children of petitioner and their mother, MAlImOll'll'!: SMITH. now deceased. "
How eloquently it thus appears on the face of the judgroll that even though appellant bas not been adjudi"un1it, " and has rather been decreed legaIq ":6t,"
. . . . . . . "' • •C...

/
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whatever that may mean, he coritinues now to be as indi1ferent
to the welfare of the children as, from the fact that they
were born out of wedlock and that he does not claim to have
ever had their custody,1 it eould be inferred he has been
from the beginning. Could it be that the real ground for
appellant's objections to having the children's adult sister
appointed their guardian is a fear that in the interests of
these minors she might seek to compel this man to contribute
suitably to their support'
And there is still further affirmative evidence in this record,
mere judgment roll though it be, of appellant's lack of concern fol' these children. Appellant asserts in his brief (and
respondent concurs in this statement) that the hearing on the
guardianship matter "was extremely brief and was based
principally upon the report of the Probation Officer and
upon an interview in Chambers between the trial judge and
the two minor children." The substance of the interview
is not shown in the record and the preference expressed by
the children does not specifically appear, but appellant urges
that such preference "is immaterial." (Italics added.) Can
we doubt what that preference is T
Appellant argues further that "it is still the law of this
State that a parent has a superior right to the custody of
his minor children, provided only he is fit and proper to have
such custody and regardless of whether Of' nof it would be
better for such children to be with a stranger." (Italics
added. ) Therefore, concludes appellant, the trial court "in
awarding the guardianship of the children ... to a stranger
[their sister or half sister who was caring for and supporting
them' against the wishes of the father who was a fit and
proper person to have their custody. abused its discretion."
It seems to me that on this record it is tbis court which abuses
its discretion in reversing the order of the trial court.
Let us look further at this record. Nowhere tberein nor in
his briefs does appellant come forth with a clear and unISO far as the record on appenl shows appellnnt does not elnim to
hn\'e supported the ehildren or even to hn\'e mnde any contrihution toward
their support. However, on the ornl argument (at the first hcnring)
befOT;? us. one of the justices. going outside the record. asked counsel fOT
appellnnt "Dill he ever support the children'''. and counsel replipd
"Yes." The inquiring justice also aslted counsel for the respondent ti,e
question "The father dH support these childrcn'" and counsel responded "The fnther contributed somcwhat to their support. yC's."
There was no stipUlation thnt tho record should be nugmented by :ldrling
al: or IIny Pllrt of tho quoted qnestions and unsworn answers, or that
&n1 of IUch "evidence" was before the trial coun.

)
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equivocal declaration that be is willing to support his children. that be desires their personal custody. that he loves
them and that he wants to best serve their welfare. and on
that account wants to be their guardian; likewise he does
not even state2 that he wishes to receive them into his family
, and otherwise treat them as if they were legitimate. either
in order that they may thereby become legitimated as provided by the Civil Code (§ 230). or in order to see to it
that their best interest and welfart' are subserved in other
respects as well
Rather. the whole tenor of appellant's
pleadings. briefs. and arguments indicates that he is stepping
, carefully around an assertion that he now wishes to assume
full responsibility for the children. instead suggests that his
chief interest is that no ont' else be placed in a position to
· assert rights of the childrt'n as against him. and that any
· authority he may have over tht' children not be lost. as would
result from tht' appointment of another as their guardian
(Civ. Code. $ 204. subd. 1. ~ The entire record tends to
eonfirm the conclusional Bndin/! of the trial court that the
.best interest and welfare of the children lit' with their sister.
· respondent berein. rather than with appellant: nevertheless.
the majority of this court. even on this judgment roll appeal.
impliedly question tht' sufficiency of the evidence to support
flnding. and argut' that certain elements of assumed
and implications of some of the findings tend to
en,,,,,,,," a contrary finding that the interests of the children
be better sf'rved bv placin~ them in the custody of
father
. 'This case appears to me to allain illustrate the poignant
. which J pointed out in my dissents in Roche
Roche (1944). 25 Cal.2d 141. 144-149 rI52 P.2d 9991;
y
Stewart Q!l53). 41 Cal.2d 447 f260 P.2d 441;

")

'38'nh.",,,,, .. nt to the filing of this eourt'l opinion when thie eaUlE' wu

it. and while respondent'. petition for rehearing was pendinll.
for appellant addressed a letter to the court in which it is stnted.
fKili:uu)ng other things. thr.t .. It is very elear to appellant that the judgmt'nt
trial court was levened and that al • !'elult thereof. no further
it neeessary
fOT appellant is able to give this Court positive assuranee
immediately upon reeeipt of thesp r.hildren Into the home of appelthea.. children will be legitimatized
Be<l1lirin.r legitimation as a pre·requilite to awarding guardianship
put the eart before the horse
."
Ihould he obvious that the letter from counsel was not before the
eourt. is not in the record. is not signed by or binding on appellant.
properq a1feet the disposition of a jud,ment roll appeal.

)
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and G1tardian~hip of Kentera (1953), 41 Ca1.2d 639. 645
[262 P.2d 317], of requiring the trial court to find a parent
to be "unfit" before it can confide the custody of a child to
another person, even when the child's best interests are found
to be with others. Who can say what "fit" or "unfit" may
mean to di1Ierent judges' If the term be cheapened to mean
less fit by comparison-and there are those who argue that
such interpretation should be given to it-then the finding
that the best interests of the children require that they be
placed with one person rather than with another is in effect
a finding that, by comparison, the latter is unfit. But why
should these children, already bearing the burden of having
illegitimate parents (which, as noted hereinabove, their father
in this record has unnecessarily alleged and has evidenced
no concern about removing) be further burdened with a find.
ing that their natural father is "unfit" to be their guardian t
The statute does not require it. The children are both less
than 10 years of age and it may well be that at some future
time changed circumstances and changed attitudes of the
father, and perhaps the wishes of the children themselves,
will indicate that it would thereafter serve their best interest
and welfare to be with the father.
As declared in the dissent in the Roche case, it is my view
that we should have confidence in trial judges and in the processes of the law which enable them to view and hear at
first hand the children, the parents and other claimants, and
that their discretion in the premises should not be so rigidly
limited as is done by the rule followed by the majority here.
To require a trial court to find a parent "unfit" in order that
it may accord the children their right to have their best
interest and welfare promoted appears to me to be harsh,
legalistic, unfair to both the children and the parent, and in
contravention of the legislative intent.
Regardl~ of differences of opinion as to the desirability
of the rule aa applied in the Roche case it is quite unnecessary
to apply it here. For this holding today there is neither
statute nor precedent requiring or supporting it. The hold.
ings of In re Campbell (1900), 130 Cal. 380 [62 P. 613],
and In re Mathew. (1917),174 Cal. 679 [164 P. 8J (see, also,
Estate of Wise (1918), 179 Cal. 423. 426 [177 P. 277J ; In ,.,
Green (1923), 192 Cal. 714, 721 f221 P. 903J) !hat a parent
of a minor child under 14 years of age, if found by the court
to be "competent to discharge the duties of guardianship"
W88 entitled to be appointed ruardian in preference to • DOD-
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parent, regardless of the best interest of the child. are both
based upon the specific language of the first sentence of former
section 1751 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That sentence
was, however, repealed in 1931, and not reenacted, although
the other provisions of the section were reenacted as sections
1406 and 1410 of the Probate Code. It thus appears that
the Legislature, in recognition of what seems to me to be the
protest expressed by this court in In re Mathews, supra, and
Edate of Wise, supra, against statutes construed to require
that the property right of a parent in a child be considered
superior to the best interest and welfare of the child, wisely
decided to. and did, remove such requirement from the law
of this state.
In the Mathews ease, decided in 1917, the court pointed out
(p. 683 of 174 Cat), that "It is argued with great force that
the trend of modern decisions is to regard as of primary im· portance the welfare of the minor himself. This is most true.
· The decisions to this effect are made either under the permission of the law, which contains no such restriction as that
·found [in 1917] in our section 1751, or else are given under
. the command of the law which, in effect, declares that over
· and above all else the controlling consideration shan be the
welfare of the child. If we were thus at liberty to act. it
· might well be that the custody of this child, under the findings
· of the court, would be given to [the nonparent with whom the
ehild had been living for some 10 years] .•. "
. It is therefore my view that the courts of this state are
longer required by statute to arbitrarily disregard the welof the child whenever a legally II fit" parent is making
_ ••~~, and need no longer adhere to the view expressed in
re Campbell (1900), supra, 130 Cal. 380, 382, that the
.,'£5.... of the parent in the child is similar to that of the owner
nl",\nprtv in his chattel and must "be regarded as coming
the reason, if not within the strict letter, of the conprovisions for the protection of property . . ."
place this property right conception of a parent's claim
children over and above the welfare of the children seems
me to be a throwback of generations if not of centuries.
mandate of our Legislature as expressed in section 1406
the Probate Code is that "In appointing a general guardian
.. a minor, the court is to be guided by what appears to be
the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal
mental and moral welfare: and if the child is of sufficient
;to form an intelligent preference, the court mq consider
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that preference in determining the question . .." These
provisions, when construed with the provision of section 1407
of the same code, that "Of persons equally entitled in othe,.
,.espects to the guardianship of a minor, preference is to be
given as follows: (1) To a parent; ... 91 (italics added),
appear to me to require that the first concern of the court
should be directed toward determining "what appears to be
for the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal
and mental and moral welfare" (italics added) as specified by
section 1406, and that only when the sum of aU of these
aspects of the child's welfare will be subserved equally well
by having the parent as guardian will the parent's right be
held as a matter of law superior.
1 am further of the view that such a philosophy, rather
than tending toward the weakening of family relationships
and the assumption of arbitrary state control over children,
will work towards the contrary result. Where. as here. although the parent is found legally "fit." it does not appear
that as between parent and child there ever has been a family
relationship, and where the parent's concern for his children'a
welfare and his wish to aerve their best interests are u.nestablished and appear to be highly questionable. bow can it
be considered that any family relationship that mi~ht be
established with him would be more desirable than that beretofore and presently enjoyed by the children with their sister.
respondent herein who. it seems. has cared for them as a labor
of love' [s it not more likely that they will grow to mature.
responsible adulthood. to take a useful place in society. when
living in the home in which the trial court found their best
interest resides. rather than being compelled to leave that home
for such abode. if any, as the father may be inclined to
designate' A.lthough I believe there is no question but that
in the vast majority of eases the best interest of the child will
tie with the natural parent and that trial judges surely ean
be depended on to so find. it nevertheless seem" to me that
this ease points up and again emphasizet! the necessity the
justice. and the rightness. of permittinfl trial judges the
exercise of a wise diseretion in deciding problems of custody
and guardianship of children Tbere are many things in this
record which. in tht' interests of the children. seem to cry
aloud for support of the trial eoun's order. yet none of those
things suggests that the trial judge should have found the
father to be "unfit" to havE' eU!ltody of children. Indeed
it would have been a cruel and unnecessary act for the trial
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court to have found the father "unfit" to have custody of
children, for there is another finding in the record. It is
that this "Natural father is remarried and bas a family of
the second marriage." To this second family appellant well
may be not only a legitimate busband and father but iII
truth a "natural" and a kindly, considerate one. Yet bow·
ever tit he is in a legalistic sense, he may be the last one
who. for the interests of the children. should be appointed
their guardian.
The findings establish that the children have DO estate.
Such findings also establish, directly or impliedly, that the
appellant is the one person who is primarily liable for the
support of the children and against whom the guardian
should assert rights on behalf of the children. But this court
, holds that as a matter of law, since appellant is not legally
"Ulltit." the welfare of the children cannot even be con·
sidered, let alone given effect.
Although I have not discussed the question of illegitimacy
as bearing upon any right of the father (except as it may be
relevant before the trial court in determining what is for
their best interest). it may be Doted that while under the
provisions of section 1403 of the Probate Code tbe consent of
both parents. if living and capable of consent. is required
for the appointment by will or deed of a guardian of a child.
nevertheless the mother alone may make such appointment if
the cbild is illegitimate. Also. section 1405 of the same code
provides that the court may appoint a guardian "wben no
guardian has been appointed
by win or by deed
..
.These sections would appear to me to cast further doubt upon
the absolute legal right here sought to be asserted by appeJ·
lant-father. (See In re BriH (1917). 176 Cal. 177 rt67 P.
: In re Imperafrtce (1920). 182 Cal. 355. 358 fl88 P 451.)
already indicated there are some assnmptions in the
opinion. and some in the concurrin/l opinion. which
appear to be inconsistent with the trial court'~ findinllS. and
to be indulged to the end of supporting a reversal rather
than an affirmance. The majority and con currin!! opinions
. speak of a new trial. But this is a mere judgment 1'011 appeal.
. and the reversal must be based on the tin dings or it is necesearily in defiance of the strict direction of section 4% of article
VI of the Constitution. Thus. as pointed out by counsel for
there is no occasion for a new trial. On the
holding appellant is, as a matter of law, entitled to

106

)

GUARDIANSHIP OF SMITH

[42 C.2d

guardianship papers, yet both the majority and concurrin
opinions suggest a new trial.
The majority say "There is an additional factor in the in1
stant case. As far as appears the minors have not bee~
legitimated. By awarding their custody to the father they
are more likely to be legitimated • • • Unless the father has
the right to custody it is not probable that he will receive
the minors into his bome and thus legitimate them." This·
speculation as to the existence or nonexistence of facts and
as to possible future events, and as to the effect thereof on
the weight or sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that it is to the best interest of the children that letters
of guardianship issue to, and that they remain in the custody
of, the respondent adult sister who has supported and cared
for them since the death of their mother several years ago,
has no legitimate place in an opinion disposing of a judgment
roll appeal.
It cannot lawfully be assumed that on a new trial there
can. be any evidence which would justify not awarding the
children's guardianship to the father, because, on evidence
which cannot be doubted, he has already been found to be
fit and that finding, as a matter of law, it is held, entitles
him to a reversal of the judgment. If on this record he is
entitled to a reversal, CJ fortiori he is entitled to letters of
guardianship without further hearing. This has to be true,
because otherwise the majority would be reversing a judgment without a showing of prejudice as required by section
4% of article VI of the California Constitution and by section 475 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The burden is on
appellant to show prejudice, i.e., a miscarriage of justice.
On this judgment roll appeal he cannot possibly show prejudice entitling him to a reversal unless on that record (upon
the findings) he is entitled to judgment in his favor, which
means the issuance of letters of guardianship on the going
down of the remittitur. Therefore, this court, if it upholds
the law, must sustain the award of letters of guardianship
to appellant upon the going down of the remittitur without
further hearing in the trial court. But evidencing at last
some slight weakening in its self-made rule of thumb for
award of custody it suggests that there should be a new trial.
Also demanding mention, to avoid possible confusion, is
the concurring opinion's statement (not concurred in by the
majority) that "On retrial the father must establish that
the childrell will be legitimated as a minimum prerequisite
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to establishing his fitness for appointment as guardian." This
statement has no legitimate place in the opinion. As already
mentioned repeatedly this is a judgment roll appeal. The
evidt?nce is not before us; it is conclusively presumed to be
sufficient to support all findings .and the findings squarely
determine that the appellant is a fit person to be appointed
guardian of the children here concerned. But if there is to
be a new trial it is to be hoped that the quoted statement
will not be accepted by the trial court. To accept it might
well work a manifest injustice to the appellant father, and to
his wife, and occasion unnecessary suffering both to these
children ·and to the presently legitimate children of appellant
• and his wife. It may be, or it may not be, to the best interests
of the children involved here that they be taken into the home
. and family of appellant. There might develop a quite natural
. resentment on the part of the legitimate children of the
..'..... ...,.uu"....'u family to what they could consider to be an in·
'. trusion. Their remarks to neighborhood children could lead
to cruelties and griefs which only the sensitive can fully
:understand and which only the callous would willfully inflict.
There can be far more sinister influences on the life of a child
. than the legal status of illegitimacv. If the appellant here
,has all the virtues· which the concurring opinion assumes for
_, __ , then his good faith determination that the welfare of
children will best be served by not taking them into
household should be respected just as much as his possible
to the contrary. In any event it is to me un·
t¥"'UA.QU" .. that a trial court should find the appellant father
if he is a good husband and father to his present family,
be "unfit" to have the custody of the children whose wel·
is here at stake.
.. The ~xtraordinary concept of "fitness" disclosed in the
.
opinion does not appear to, at least at this time,
the concurrence of any other justice of this court and is
I think, likely to commend itself to many trial judges
duty it is to deal face to face with live children and
and blood parents and custodians. Judges who handle
cases have, in my observation of their work, exhibited a
respect for the law, a conscientious fidelity to duty, and
wisdom and patience in seeking to determine the course
will best serve the interests of the children. Such judges,
are regretful that we arbitrarily deny to them the
to consider the welfare of the children as opposed to a
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custody claim of a parent unless the parent be found "unfit."
The trial judge, when he is confronted with facts which in.
dicate that for a while the interests of a child imperatively
demand placement with a person other than a parent. ordi·
narily uses that means to bridge the present emergency. and
he looks to the future and possible restoration of thechUd to
the custody of a parent (or parents) at a later date. The
law. 88 enacted by the Legislature. contemplates such procedure and every custody order is subject to modification
during the child's minority A judlreso engaged realizes
that few domestic relations concept~ could be more ernel in
application and regrettable in result than a wil1in~e~ to
lightly-but necessarily publicly and indelibly-brand a
parent 88 "unfit ,. Such brandinll would almost certainly
mean that the parent could never hope to regain either the
custody or respect or aff£>ction of hi~ child: no more could
the child hope to rejoin his parent. Such II branding could
add immeasurably to the burdens and handicaps of the ehi).
dren affected. And it would do all this without any necessity
therefor. simply to satisfy a court·made rule which is adhered
to in direct derogation of the legislative poliev
[t should further be pointed out that the concurring opinion.
after at least suggesting lip service to the view that it would
be harsh to place the rights of a "fit" parent above the best
interests of the child. then goes on to assert that "The heart
of the problem. however. is how the best interests of the child
are to be served. ls the trial court more sensitive than the
parent to what the child's best interests are. better qualified
to determine how they are to bt> served' it would seem
inherent in the very concept of a fit parent that such a parent
would bt> at least as responsive as the trial court. and very
probably more so, to the best interests of the child" Such an
assertion completely ignores thE' obvion~ fact that it is in
controversies in which the parent's responsiveness to the best
interests of the child has been cal1£>d into qnestion. that trial
courts are called upon to determinE' whE're such interests lie,
and that in such controversies our Constitution and the '.Je~s
Isture have entrusted to trial courts I"xel'eisine: a propel' discretion. rather than to l"ither parent!'l 01' appl"l1atl" courts,
the determination of the issue. 'do not share at aU the in·
dieated deprecatory view of thl" wisdom of trial jndges And
I would leave with them. appreciatively. thl" fun scope of discretion given them by the Legislature in the handling of the
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.,ery difficult and delicate problems which daily confront them
in domestic relations court.
I would affirm the order appealed from.
EDMONDS, J.-In a proceeding to appoint a guardian for
• minor child. the court must be guided "by what appears to
be the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal
and mental and moraJ welfare." (Prob. Code, § 1406.) The
eode provisions relating to the custody of a legitimate minor
child. as construed in Roche v. Roche, 25 Ca1.2d 141 [152
. P.2d 999], Stewart v. Stewart. 41 Ca1.2d 447 f260 P.2d 44],
and G1tardianshtp Of Kentera. 41 Cal.2d 639 [262 P.2d
817], are a legislative determination that the child's interest
'will be best served if the right of the natural parent to his
is made paramount to that of a stranger. In this
.
section 197 of the Civil Code specifically provides
.. [i]f either the father or mother fof a legitimate unminor child 1 be dead or unable or refuse to take
custody or has abandoned his or her family, the other
ia entitled to its custody. services and earnings."
-, There is no similar provision in regard to an illegitimate
. .mild. Section 200 of the Civil Code. which eoncerns the
eustody of such a child. gives that right to the mother without
mention of the father's status UpOD her death. In short,
there is no legislative determination that. when the mother
Is dead~ the interest of the ehild will be better served by a
right in the father superior to that of any other
eonclusiQn reached in the majority and eoncurring
,V}J'UI."""" is based upon the rule which governs judicial deter-

IaDination of the eustody of legitimate children. But there
far less reason to suppose that the generally undesired
of an illicit relationship will enjoy the same paternal
and affeetion as that of a legitimate one.
.• _.~. __.v eoncern is expressed by my associates in regard to
probability of legitimating the child. According to
.~rmrtip.e Carter, the child more likely will be legitimated if
father is given a paramount right to his custody. Justice
...,.Il'in",.. takes the position that a willingness to legitimate the
_._"'~".:I is a minimum prerequisite to a showing of the father'. i
The probability of legitimation is a consideration which j
be too strongly emphasized. But in my opinion, there j
:ao reMOI3a1Me __ fOl' oea~ . . . f&tDer will 1M
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more moved to do what is right if he is given a paramount
right to custody. To permit the trial judge to ascertain
first that the child will be legitimated before awarding custody to the father and, in the absence of such action, to award
custody to another qualified person would more nearly achieve
that objective. Otherwise the trial judge must award custody
to the father without assurance that the child will be legitimated or, according to the alternative suggestion, may declare
the father unfit if legitimation is not accomplished, despite
the fact that the only hindrance may be the failure of his
wife to consent.
The trial court found that the best interests of the children
will be ·served by giving their custody to Frieda Howes. The
appeal being on the judgment roll, it must be presumed
that the evidence supports that determination.· If upon a
future application it should be shown that the· children's
interests would be better served because of a change in conditions of which legitimation of the children may be one, a
different order may be made. But upon the present record,
I would affirm the order of the trial court.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.
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